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JUDICIAL POWER, THE JUDICIAL POWER PROJECT AND THE UK
PAUL CRAIG*
I INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that all power requires justification, and that is equally true for
judicial power as for other species thereof. This article is primarily concerned with
judicial power in the UK. The subject will be approached through consideration of the
Judicial Power Project, which has been critical of the courts, much of this being sharp-
edged, and fierce. There is repeated talk ofjudicial overreach and consequent legitimacy
crisis, as the courts are said to encroach on terrain that is properly the preserve of the
political branch of government.'
It is by the same token important that the critics are properly scrutinized. This is a
fortiori so the more far-reaching the critique, especially when the project has a 'political
dimension', informing governmental views about judicial power. The article begins by
setting out the principal argument of the Judicial Power Project, henceforth JPP. It then
assesses the JPP's claims from four perspectives: individual cases, judicial review
doctrine, judicial practice and the theory of adjudication.
I should at the outset clarify my own position: academics should critically assess
all exercise of power, including judicial power and have always done so; courts should
show respect for other branches of government on constitutional, epistemic and
institutional grounds, and in general terms have done so.2 I do not believe that the JPP's
claims are supported by evidence flowing from the positive law, and they rest on
normative assumptions concerning the limits of what common law courts should be able
to do that are highly contestable.
It should be acknowledged that the JPP site accepts responses that take a contrary
view to publications it has posted. It is open, and this is to be commended. 3 While there
are responses to particular papers, there has, to my knowledge, not been a more general
assessment of the project, and the evidence on which it rests. That is the objective of the
present article.
Professor of English Law, St John's College, Oxford. An earlier version of this paper was given
at the Administrative Law Bar Association (ALBA) Meeting 23 July 2016. The general theme of
the conference was 'Is it Time to Rein in the Judges?'. I am grateful for comments from those at
the ALBA conference, and from Eirik Bjorge, Mark Freedland, Aileen Kavanagh, Jeff King, Sir
Stephen Sedley and Alison Young.
See e.g. the work of Policy Exchange's Judicial Power Project
<www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/about/>.
2 For a statement of my detailed arguments in this respect, see P Craig, UK, EU and Global
Administrative Law, Foundations and Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2015), Ch. 2.
I can attest to this on a personal level. Richard Ekins encouraged me to post my views on the JPP
site after the ALBA conference that we both attended, even though he knew that I was critical of
the JPP. I did not have time to complete the paper at that stage. Richard Ekins also encouraged me
to participate in this symposium on judicial power.
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II THE JUDICIAL POWER PROJECT: THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT
The detailed claims made by the Judicial Power Project will be examined in due
course. It is nonetheless important to be clear at the outset about the general nature of
the thesis.
The focus of this project is on the proper scope of the judicial power within the
constitution. Judicial overreach increasingly threatens the rule of law and effective,
democratic government. The project aims to address this problem - restoring
balance to the Westminster constitution - by articulating the good sense of
separating judicial and political authority. In other words, the project aims to
understand and correct the undue rise in judicial power by restating, for modern times
and in relation to modern problems, the nature and limits of thejudicial power within
our tradition and the related scope of sound legislative and executive authority.4
The Judicial Power Project acknowledges that 'judicial power has a central,
strategic place in any well-ordered constitutional arrangement' and it is accepted that
there is a role for courts 'in securing the rule of law, by fairly adjudicating disputes in
accordance with settled law'. This is, however, subject to the caveat that such judicial
power has not generally involved 'oversight of the justice or prudence of the laws that
fall to be applied', with the consequence that 'the courts have a limited capacity to
develop the common law'. 6
For the JPP, Parliament is the body principally charged with protecting human
rights, as attested to by its role in abolishing slavery, extending the franchise,
establishing the National Health Service, protecting workers who form unions,
abolishing capital punishment, and decriminalizing homosexual acts. It is Parliament
that has the principal responsibility for overseeing the content of the law and changing
it when required. The supremacy of Parliament within the constitution does not therefore
constitute 'a departure from the rule of law or a failure to recognize the importance of
human rights'. 7 For the JPP,8
[T]he good sense of this separation of powers is now increasingly doubted,
within Britain and, in different ways, in other common law countries. Many in
the academy and legal profession now share an expansive, adventurous
understanding of judicial power and the willingness and authority of the
courts . to oversee Parliament's lawmaking actions or to overrule the
executive's exercise of its lawful powers has sharply expanded.
The adherents to the JPP do not contend that the expansion of judicial power is the
result of any single development. To the contrary, they regard it as a complex
phenomenon, which is driven in part by a wider global trend, influenced by US thought,
and in part by 'the increasing self-confidence of the legal community and a
corresponding failure of confidence in the adequacy of parliamentary government or
democratic politics'.9
There is, by parity of reason, said to be no single political or legal decision,
including the Human Rights Act 1998, which explains the rise of judicial power within
the United Kingdom, and the expansion ofjudicial authority is not limited to the field of
4 Judicial Power Project <www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/about/>.
Ibid.
6 Ibid.
Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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human rights law. It is, moreover, argued that the rise in judicial power within the United
Kingdom has taken place without sustained public debate, the critique being that the
constitution 'should not be fundamentally unsettled in so haphazard or surreptitious a
way'.io The self-avowed aim of the JPP is to address this problem by making clear 'the
ways in which the judiciary's place in the constitution has been changing, and might
well change in the future, and then giving these developments and possibilities the close
attention that they deserve'.
The project's concern is with how and by whom public power is
exercised. Doubts about the wisdom of an expansive, adventurous understanding of
judicial power have been, are and should be shared by people and groups who
otherwise have very different political commitments. The project's central idea is
that the decisions of Parliament ought not to be called into question by the courts and
that the executive ought to be free from undue judicial interference, which fails to
respect political judgment and discretion. These are broad propositions - the devil
will often be in the details - but nonetheless they warrant restatement and
application to new problems in our law and practice. They are open to adoption by
all who share a commitment to parliamentary democracy and the rule of law.1 2
These are powerful and important claims. They must perforce be sustained. The
more far-reaching the claim, the better must be the empirical and normative grounding
for the argument.' 3 The remainder of this article unpacks these claims and subjects them
to close scrutiny.
III JPP EVIDENCE: PROBLEMATIC CASES
The concerns voiced by the JPP are predicated on certain data, as is evident from
the website. A prominent part of this is the listing of 50 problematic cases, which are
said to exemplify the infirmities that beset the exercise of judicial power.1 4 Analysis and
critique of individual decisions is part of what we academics do; no problem with that.
There will inevitably be judicial decisions that receive a critical reception, but this is to
say no more than that all institutions, including the political branch of government, are
imperfect. There are, however, significant problems with this 'rap sheet' of judicial
infirmity.
First, there is no clear rationale for inclusion on the list. The adjectival form
'problematic' is protean. It is clearly intended by the JPP to cover a range of 'judicial
sins', including excessive judicial activism, poor judicial reasoning, insufficient
deference to the primary decision-maker, and lack of fidelity to text." It is, however,
often unclear which infirmity is said to attach to a particular case on the list. This
difficulty is exacerbated because the explanation/justification for inclusion on the list is
exiguous in the extreme. Complex judicial decisions are condemned on the basis of a
three to five-line summation of the alleged infirmity in the reasoning and result. This
comes dangerously close to CNN sound-bite commentary, where there is no warrant for
'o Ibid.
1 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
'3 See also, A Kavanagh, 'Constitutional Review, the Courts and Democratic Scepticism' (2009) 62
Current Legal Problems 102.
14 R Ekins and G Gee, 50 Problematic Cases (2016) Judicial Power Project
<www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/50-problematic-cases/>.
' Ibid.
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this form of assessment, more especially because the critic can thereby avoid meaningful
scrutiny of his or her own reasoning by the very brevity of the summation on the charge
sheet.
Secondly, the JPP architects of the list eschew claims as to methodological
robustness and express the wish that it will prompt further debate.' This is, however,
problematic from both a legal and political perspective. Thus, while there has been some
exchange in this respect, 17 the relative paucity is readily explicable, legally and
politically. In legal terms, the choices for engagement are limited. The commentator can
engage in tit for tat soundbites, but then most academics rightly think that this is wasted
time. The alternative strategy is to write a longer memo, three to four pages, explaining
why the initial characterization of the case is misplaced. This, however, lends credibility
to a mode of argumentation that is not academically sound: a three-line soundbite does
not create the onus to produce a three-page defence, and we are diminished academically
if we believe it to be so. The same conclusion emerges from a political perspective,
albeit for very different reasons. The JPP seeks to exert political influence. That is readily
apparent from its placing within the larger Policy Exchange network,1 8 from the fact that
the Secretary State for Justice turns up when the leading JPP theorist is giving a lecture
and from multiple other sources on the site. This is not, I should hasten to add,
illegitimate. There is, nonetheless, a certain nalvet6 about the JPP in this respect. The
salient point is that some in the political forum who are antagonistic to courts welcome
the idea that major decisions can be eviscerated in three lines. They will not seek further
explication. They will not look for contestation. Truth to tell, the three-line critique plays
into a tabloid view of the courts. Claims by JPP proponents that they never meant the
material to be taken in this way will come as scant comfort. They would do well to
remember the Faustian lesson, viz that those who believe themselves in control may in
reality end up being 'played' by the very forces they seek to influence.
Thirdly, if we assume that the critic is operating 'rationally' the three to six lines
should embody the most potent critique of the decision. There were, nonetheless, many
occasions when such critiques misconstrued the reasoning, policy or result in the case.
There were other instances where the brief appraisal ignored the complexity of the issues
the court had to resolve, fastening critically on one 'issue', while ignoring other textual
and normative considerations that informed the court's reasoning. 20
Fourthly, the difficulty in this respect is exacerbated by the fact that a case can be
criticised for being problematic in certain respects, while it might also be regarded as
being a good decision as judged by other desiderata valued by the JPP. Consider by way
of example the inclusion of Cart on the list,21 the reason being that it involves too much
judicial discretion in deciding whether to review for error of law. Leaving aside whether
this critique is correct or not, it is clearly in tension with another prominent JPP objective,
which is to accord greater deference to the primary decision-maker, which the Supreme
Court's decision clearly does.
16 Ibid.
17 See, e.g., S Lee, A Problematic Manifesto? (2016) Judicial Power Project
<www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/simon-lee-a-problematic-manifesto/>; and A McHarg, 50
Problematic Cases: A Comment (2016) Judicial Power Project
<www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/aileen-mcharg-50-problematic-cases-a-comment/>.
18 Policy Exchange <www.policyexchange.org.uk/>.
19 This is true of pretty much all the EU cases on the list, and of many of the domestic cases.
20 See, just by way of example, Benkharbouche v Republic of Sudan [2015] EWCA Civ 33, upheld
on appeal, [2017] UKSC 62; Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKIIL
32; R (Quila) v Secretary ofState for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 45.
21 R (Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28.
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Fifthly, the list is asymmetrical between judicial over-reach and judicial under-
reach. To be sure, the JPP can in principle criticize courts for being excessively reticent,
as exemplified by the inclusion of Liversidge22 on the list. The reality is, nonetheless,
that the predominant focus is on judicial over-reach. This impression is reinforced by the
detailed studies on the website, all of which have this focus. This asymmetry is a serious
problem with the project. There is no pragmatic or normative argument presented as to
why judicial over-reach, insofar as it exists, is more serious than judicial under-reach.
Thus why not include cases such as Nakkuda Ali, 23 Duncan,24 and Church Assembly 25 as
instances where the courts placed undue limitations on judicial review; why not criticise
earlier case law as being insufficiently supportive of rights, including fundamental rights
based on gender and race? This asymmetry between judicial over-reach and judicial
under-reach is further evident in the 'double jeopardy' faced by the courts, damned if
they do too much, damned if they do too little. The tensions in this respect are readily
apparent in the case law on process rights in contexts where statutory closed material
procedures apply. 26
Sixthly, the preceding difficulties are exemplified by the critical treatment of the
decision in Miller,2 7 where the Supreme Court decided that the executive could not
trigger Article 50 TEU without securing statutory approval from Parliament. The
decision was contestable, as attested to by Lord Reed's strident dissent. The salient point
is, however, why the decision was felt to be problematic from the JPP perspective. It
might be argued that this was another instance of judicial usurpation of political power.
This does not, however, withstand examination, since the case was not about accretion
of judicial power at the expense of the political. The contestation was as to whether the
power to trigger Article 50 TEU should reside with the legislature or the executive. This
was the zero-sum issue in the Miller litigation, and the result either way did not augment
judicial power. It might be contended by way of response that the decision was
problematic in a different way, viz that the Supreme Court's reasoning was defective in
certain respects. This is indeed the nub of many of the critical postings. This reveals the
protean meanings of the term 'problematic' within the JPP agenda, since insofar as it
includes decisions where the reasoning was felt to be defective it would thereby
encompass all academic commentary on case law, with the consequence that the JPP
project would cease to serve any independent function. The very attribution of the label
defective to the Supreme Court's reasoning is itself highly contestable. I believe that the
majority decision was correct,28 and I also believe that the answer one way or another
requires close attention to complex argumentation of a kind that cannot be done in short
blogs on the decision.
Lastly, there is something 'mildly Kafkaesque' about the list, if that is not an
oxymoron, which it probably is. Picture the scenario: the somnolent law reports,
disturbed by the midnight click on the internet link to the database; the sturdy JPP
22 Liversidge v Anderson [ 1942] AC 206.
23 Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne [1951] AC 66. See also, R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex. p
Parker [1953] 1 WLR 1150 QBD; Rv Leman Street Police Station Inspector, ex. p Venicoff [ 920]
3 KB 72.
24 Duncan v Cammell, Laird & Co Ltd [ 1942] AC 6.
25 Church Assembly [ 1928] 1 KB 41.
26 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2010] 2 AC 269; Secretary of State for the
Home Department v AF [2010] 2 AC 269; Al Rawi v Security Service (Justice and others
intervening) [2011] UKSC 34.
27 R (Miller) v Secretary ofState for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
28 P Craig, 'Miller, Structural Constitutional Review and the Limits to Prerogative Power' [2017]
Public Law Special Issue 48.
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messenger revealing those on the charge sheet, 'Cart, Bancoult, Hirst, step forward';
scant explanation for being placed on the list of problematic cases, bad reasoning, bad
result, bad judgment, take your pick, tick a box; no explanation concerning the informer
that 'fingered' the particular case for inclusion in the list; no due process, no apparent
way of being removed from the charge sheet; a sound dose of judicial re-education to
prevent future infirmity, with compulsory daily readings of set texts on the limits to the
judicial role; and of course special treatment reserved for the judicial recidivists, the
repeat offenders, who must be purged in some more dramatic manner. To adopt a
Kantian perspective, one cannot but wonder how the academic organizers of the JPP
would react if their scholarship were to be treated in analogous fashion. We could
construct a rap sheet of academic infirmity, in which complex arguments were
condemned through a three or four-line statement appended to the article. The howls of
indignation at such unjust treatment would echo through the academic corridors and
beyond.
IV JPP EVIDENCE: LEGISLATION, COURTS AND DOCTRINE
The discussion thus far has been on individual cases. The focus now shifts from the
specific to the more general. A recurring feature in the JPP literature is the idea that we
are facing a legitimacy crisis, or something akin thereto. It features as a headline on the
website and informs many of the policy papers placed thereon. Good news is rarely as
gripping as bad news, at least insofar as it relates to the courts. A conclusion expressed
as crisis will therefore pay commensurate publicity dividends, even more so if the crisis
can be cast in terms of legitimacy and judicial over-reach. The power of criticism
nonetheless comes with attendant responsibility: the more far-reaching the critique, the
better must be the ammunition to sustain it; and the more far-reaching the criticism, the
more searching should be the evaluation thereof. There are three related points that are
relevant in this respect.
A Conflation ofDifferent Rationales for Alleged Judicial Over-reach
The JPP site and the contributions thereto conflate two very different rationales for
the judicial over-reach, which they claim to identify. There is the contention that the
judiciary is over-reaching in ordinary judicial review cases by exercising such review in
a manner that is too intrusive, and hence trespasses on the role of the
legislature/executive. There is also the claim that the judiciary are making judgments of
a kind for which they are ill-suited under the HRA, or which should be the preserve of
the legislature, even though when doing so they are fulfilling an express constitutional
or legislative obligation cast on them. The conflation of these issues is evident in the
descriptive brief of the JPP mission, 29 and permeates many contributions to the JPP site.
Where the distinction is noted, it tends to be oblique and in passing, as evident in the
29 Above n 4.
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contributions from Jeffrey Goldsworthy 30 and John Finnis. 31 This is problematic for the
following reason.
There is a mountain of literature on the legitimacy of constitutional review, more
especially the hard-edged variety, whereby courts invalidate primary legislation for
constitutional infirmity. 32 The JPP project adds nothing new in this respect, nor is it the
purpose of this article to revisit this terrain. What is apposite to the present inquiry is the
following. While this debate is commonly conducted with US literature as the backdrop,
it is distinctive insofar as the US Constitution provides no express authority for the courts
to review primary legislation. The reality, by way of contrast, is that many constitutions
make express provision for such review, and so too does the UK, albeit through statute
in the form of the Human Rights Act 1998."
There is a tension, to say the very least, between a core precept of the JPP, which
is respect for political choice, and dislike of this choice insofar as it invests courts with
authority to engage in rights-based review that some believe that they should not have.
There is something markedly ironic about a project that extols the virtue of deliberative
political choice, while deprecating the result thus made by countless nations, including
the UK, which have expressly opted for rights-based review in a constitution or statute.
This is seeking to play both sides of the street at the same time.
The elliptical use of terminology is dangerous, more especially when it is politically
laden. There is the world of difference between a 'legitimacy crisis' cast in terms of
courts allegedly trespassing on the legislature's terrain; and such a crisis that connotes
the difficulties said to flow from the discharge of a constitutional or legislative mandate
expressly accorded to the courts. The reality is that the JPP elides the two,
notwithstanding the fact that the normative considerations that underpin them are very
different.
The use of the term legitimacy in the former context connotes the idea that the
courts are thereby intruding on terrain where they have no authority to do so; the use of
the term in the latter context is quite different, capturing the idea that even if the courts
have an obligation to undertake rights-based adjudication flowing from a constitution or
a statute there are legitimacy problems because the court is forced to, for example,
balance variables that are said to be incommensurable.
30 J Goldsworthy, Losing Faith in Democracy: Why Judicial Supremacy is Rising and What to do
About it (2015) Judicial Power Project <www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/jeffrey-goldsworthy-
losing-faith-in-democracy-why-judicial-supremacy-is-rising-and-what-to-do-about-it/>.
Compare, however, J Goldsworthy, 'Judicial Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy'
(2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review 451, 457.
31 See, e.g., J Finnis, Judicial Power: Past, Present and Future (2015) Judicial Power Project
<judicialpowerproject.org.uk/john-finnis-judicial-power-past-present-and-future/>.
32 See, e.g., J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999) and 'The Core Case
against Judicial Review', 115 Yale Law Journal 1346 (2006); R Bellamy, Political
Constitutionalism, A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge
University Press, 2007); M Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts (Princeton
University Press, 1999); R Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution (Oxford University Press, 1996); C Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government
(Harvard University Press, 2001); L Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American
Constitutional Practice (Yale University Press, 2004).
33 For analysis of the numbers, see, T Ginsburg and M Versteeg, 'Why do Countries Adopt
Constitutional Review?' (2013) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1.
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The complex issues raised by this latter type of claim cannot be analysed in detail
here.34 Suffice it to say the following: there is little in the JPP that addresses this latter
issue; the general JPP discourse on the topic is shot through by assumptions concerning
the existence of balancing in public law, and its alleged absence in private law that are
contestable; and it is also shot through by contestable presuppositions as to whether
judicial creativity manifest in the creation of a doctrinal rule that involves the admixture
of two or more foundational values is any less significant than ad hoc balancing in
individual cases.
B Conflation of the Particular and the General
It might be argued by way of response that the courts have exceeded their mandate
in ordinary judicial review actions and thus trespassed on legislative terrain, and/or that
they have gone beyond their brief under the HRA 1998. There is no doubt that some
particular cases might be criticised. That is inevitable in any such regime. This does not,
however, show systemic failure, legitimacy crisis, or anything akin thereto.
The legal reality is that UK judicial review doctrine is shot through with discussion
of the deference/respect/weight that courts do and should accord to primary decision-
makers. It informs judicial3 5 and academic discourse.3 6 There is debate concerning the
34 See on these issues, e.g., J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press, 1988), Ch 13; E
Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Harvard University Press, 1993); R Chang (ed),
Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, 1997);
Incommensurable Values (2007) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
<www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-incommensurable/>; C Sunstein, 'Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law' (1993-94) 92 Michigan Law Review 779; Symposium on Law and
Incommensurability (1998) 146 University ofPennsylvania Law Review 1169; P Craig, 'Limits of
Law: Reflections from Private and Public Law', in N Barber, R Ekins and P Yowell (eds), Lord
Sumption and the Limits ofLaw (Hart, 2016) 175-192.
3 See, e.g., R vDPP, exp. Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326; R (Begum) v Denbigh High School Governors
[2007] 1 AC 100; Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin'Ltd [2007] 1 WLR 1420; R (Countryside
Alliance) v Attorney General [2008] 1 AC 719; R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of
State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] 1 AC 1312; Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC
39; R (Lord Carlile of Berriew QC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC
60; Michalak v General Medical Council [2017] UKSC 71.
36 D Dyzenhaus, 'The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy', in M Taggart (ed),
The Province ofAdministrative Law (Hart, 1997) Ch 13; P Craig, 'The Courts, the Human Rights
Act and Judicial Review' (2001) 117 Law Quarterly Review 589; R Edwards, 'Judicial Deference
and the Human Rights Act' (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 859; Lord Hoffmann, 'Separation of
Powers' [2002] JR 137; J Jowell, 'Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity'
[2003] Public Law 592; M Hunt, 'Sovereignty's Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law Needs
the Concept of "Due Deference"' in N Bamforth and P Leyland (eds), Public Law in a Multi-
Layered Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2003) Ch 13; T R S Allan, 'Common Law Reason
and the Limits of Judicial Deference', in D Dyzenhaus (ed), The Unity of Public Law (Hart, 2004)
Ch 11; L Tremblay, 'The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue Between Courts
and Legislatures' (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 617; R Clayton, 'Judicial
Deference and 'Democratic Dialogue': The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention under the Human
Rights Act' [2004] Public Law 33; Lord Steyn, 'Deference: A Tangled Story' [2005] Public Law
346; T Hickman, 'Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act'
[2005] Public Law 306; T R S Allan, 'Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of "Due
Deference"' [2006] Cambridge Law Journal 671; Lord Justice Dyson, 'Some Thoughts on
Judicial Deference' [2006] JR 103; R Clayton, 'Principles for Judicial Deference' [2006] JR 109;
T Hickman, 'The Courts and Politics after the Human Rights Act: A Comment' [2008] Public Law
84; J King, 'Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint' (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal
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circumstances in which such deference/respect/weight should be accorded, but this is to
be expected. The reality is that there is significant commonality in the judicial and
academic discussion as to when such respect should be shown, notwithstanding
differences concerning nomenclature and taxonomy. Thus few doubt the epistemic and
institutional rationales for giving respect, with admittedly more debate as to whether it
should be afforded on constitutional grounds.
The relevant point for present purposes is that we in the UK do not inhabit a world
in which the judiciary routinely substitute judgment on discretionary choices for that of
the administration. To the contrary, our jurisprudence is permeated by judicial
recognition of the need for caution, and this plays out time and again in HRA and non-
HRA case law. There are to be sure controversial cases where it can be argued that the
courts went too far,3 or indeed that they did not go far enough.38 This is inevitable, but
provides nothing like the requisite empirical foundation for claims concerning
legitimacy crisis, or systemic failure manifest in judicial over-reach. The temptation to
regard questionable individual decisions as evidence of some more general malaise
within the system is an impulse that should be resisted, whether the decisions are judicial
or political in nature. If you wish to make the more general claim, then there is an
obligation to provide the empirical grounding for it, which must be balanced and
objective.
It is, in a similar vein, important to consider carefully arguments that courts have
made mistakes, more especially so when it is said that the error concerns not merely an
individual case, but has wider implications. Consider in this respect Richard Ekins' claim
that the 'courts are responsible for extending the [Human Rights] Act beyond its
intended scope'. 39 Ekins regardsjudicial interpretation of HRA section 3 as a particularly
egregious instance of this, arguing that it has been wrongly understood to create ajudicial
power to change the meaning of legislation, whereas it merely imposed a duty on all
parties to read legislation to be in conformity with Convention rights.
There are doubtless various ways in which the injunction in section 3 could be read,
and the line between interpretation and legislation can be difficult. The argument that
the interpretation of section 3 in Ghaidan 41 constitutes some radical judicial
misconstruction of the HRA does not, however, withstand examination. The injunction
in section 3 to read and give effect to primary and secondary legislation so as to conform
to Convention rights, insofar as it is possible to do so, clearly accords a power and a duty
to courts. They are to fulfil this duty within the limits of interpretation, the boundaries
of which were delineated in Ghaidan. The House of Lords did not, as Ekins maintains, 42
Studies 409; A Young, 'In Defence of Due Deference' (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 554; A
Kavanagh, 'Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory' (2010) 126 Law
Quarterly Review 222; A Brady, Proportionality and Deference under the Human Rights Act
1998: An Institutionally Sensitive Approach (Cambridge University Press, 2012); P Daly, A
Theory ofDeference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (Cambridge University
Press, 2012); M Elliott, 'Proportionality and Deference: The Importance of a Structured Approach',
University of Cambridge, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 32/2013; Craig, above n 2, 236-
55; A Young, Democratic Dialogue and the Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2017).
37 See, e.g., R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21.
38 See, e.g., Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex. p Rehman [2002] 1 All ER 122.
3 R Ekins, The Dynamics of Power in the New British Constitution (2017) Judicial Power Project
<www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/richard-ekins-the-dynamics-of-judicial-power/> 9.
40 A Kavanagh, 'The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under the Human Rights
Act 1998' (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 259.
4' Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557.
42 Ekins, above n 39, 10.
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say that the statutory words and intended meaning were to be disregarded. It held that
the words might be qualified and modified. This would in turn depend, inter alia, on
whether the suggested interpretation was in accord with fundamental features of the
statute; and on whether the change had broader implications, such that it should be left
to the legislature, 43 and not be done by the courts pursuant to section 3.44 It should,
moreover, be noted that the case law post-Ghaidan does not reveal judicial re-writing of
legislation in the manner suggested by Ekins. There are numerous instances where the
courts held that it was not possible to interpret the legislation consistently with
Convention rights, and therefore issued a declaration of incompatibility under section 4
HRA. 4 5
C Empirical Foundation for JPP Claims: Case Studies
It might be argued that the judicial excess of authority is evident in particular
doctrinal studies written for the JPP,. which are highly critical of the courts. Such
critiques must, however, be sustained, more especially because many such studies make
far-reaching claims. Space precludes examination of all such papers. A couple of
examples will suffice in this respect.
Jason Varuhas' paper, entitled Judicial Capture of Political Accountability,
concerns judicial review of the Ombudsman, which he regards as illegitimate and
symptomatic of some broader legitimacy malaise that besets the courts.46 He contends
that the PCA is an officer of the House of Commons, responsible to the Public
Administration and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee. For Varuhas, the
lawmaker's intention was that the PCA should answer only to the House of Commons.
The PCA system was, in his view, intended as an alternative and autonomous system for
dispute resolution running parallel to and independent of courts.
Varuhas is particularly excised by the type of reasonableness review used in
Bradley47 and EMAG, 48 which he regards as beyond the legitimate judicial remit.
Varuhas contends that the scope of review was enlarged, and that the 'courts adopted an
exceptionally aggressive approach' to such review. 49 The cases are said to be beset by a
double infirmity: the courts had the temerity to review not just the PCA decision, but the
ministerial response thereto; and the courts subjected the Minister's views 'to searching
scrutiny, effectively intervening because the court disagreed with or was not itself
convinced by the Minister's reasoning or view'. 5o Varuhas castigates the courts for
43 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 [33], [34], [49], [114]. These limits were said to be
exemplified by earlier decisions in Re S [2002] 2 AC 291 and Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC
467.
4 A Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge University Press,
2009), Ch 3.
45 See, e.g., A v Secretary ofState for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68; R (Wilkinson) v Inland
Revenue Commissioners [2005] 1 WLR 1718; R (Clift) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2007] 1 AC 484; AS (Somalia) v Entry Clearance Officer (Addis Ababa) [2009]
UKHL 32; R (Wright) v Secretary ofState for Health [2009] 1 AC 739; R(F) v Secretary ofState
for the Home Department [2011] 1 AC 331.
46 Jason Varuhas, Judicial Capture of Political Accountability (2016) Judicial Power Project
<www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/jason-varuhas-judicial-capture-of-political-accountability/>.
47 R (on the application of Bradley) v Secretary ofState for Work and Pensions [2008] 3 All ER
1116.
48 R (on the application of Equitable Members Action Group) v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC
(Admin) 2495.
49 Varuhas, above n 46, 12.
'0 Ibid 13.
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departing from classic Wednesbury reasoning, said to be a 'totem of non-intervention'.
The decision in Bradley is said to entail a radical departure from Wednesbury orthodoxy,
since the court required ministerial rejection of the PCA's findings to be based on cogent
reasons, which 'effectively involves the court asking for itself whether the Minister's
reasons stack up or are convincing',"' with the consequence that there is 'very little light
between such approach and the court intervening simply because it disagrees with the
Minister's view' .52
There is much in Varuhas' paper that turns on wider assumptions concerning the
nature of public law, and the role of the courts therein. They cannot be addressed here,
since that would take us beyond the scope of the present paper. 3 The analysis will,
therefore, focus more directly on the arguments concerning the ombudsman regime. The
JPP deserves credit for hosting responses to its publications by those who take different
views. It is, therefore, fitting to give voice to such views on Varuhas' paper.
Richard Kirkham concluded that while the judiciary sometimes made mistakes,
they performed a powerful service in retaining the integrity of the PCA model created
by Parliament. He is, moreover, sceptical as to conclusions of a legitimacy crisis, stating
that a more balanced assessment of the case law 'on the ombudsman sector would have
been that not only does it provide little evidence of a legitimacy crisis, but arguably it
provides model guidance for how a judge should demonstrate institutional restraint to
avoid all the concerns that Varuhas raises'.5 4
Consider in the same vein Carol Harlow's response to Varuhas' paper, more
especially given that she regards balance between courts and Parliament as particularly
important. She expresses some sympathy with Varuhas' general line of argument, and
accepts that there have been cases where the courts strayed too far, but contends that the
position in relation to the PCA is more nuanced than is apparent from Varuhas'
argument.
Her starting point is that while the PCA is an officer of the House of Commons, the
office is largely independent and autonomous, and the 'PCA is not and was never
envisaged as a political actor'. 5 She rejects Varuhas' conceptualization of the PCA as a
parallel and autonomous justice system. For Carol Harlow, the Parliamentary and Health,
Service Ombudsman 'is a member of our oversized family of public ombudsmen and an
inherent part of our fragmented administrative justice system', but 'this does not mean;
however, that the PCA operates as a parallel and autonomous justice system'." While
supportive of the PCA, Harlow also accepts that mistakes can be made, and that the PCA
must therefore be amenable to judicial review. The ombudsmen were, as she argues,
either carrying out administrative functions as investigators, in which case their
decisions were clearly reviewable; or if they were adjudicators, they could be classified
with subordinate jurisdictions. The judicial review should, however, be sensitive to the
PCA's expertise, and she draws an analogy with Cart.5 7
si Ibid 16.
52 Ibid 16.
53 For discussion, see, P Craig, 'Taxonomy and Public Law: A Response', forthcoming.
54 R Kirkham, A Reply to Judicial Capacity of Political Accountability (2016) Judicial Power
Project <www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/richard-kirkham-a-reply-to-judicial-capture-of-
political-accountability/ >.
ss C Harlow, A Comment on Judicial Capture of Political Accountability (2016) Judicial Power
Project <www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/carol-harlow-a-reply-to-judicial-capture-of-
political-accountability/>.
Ibid.
s7 R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28.
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Carol Harlow also takes a different view concerning the second limb of the
argument, the standard of review used in Bradley. The ministerial decision was, as she
rightly notes, clearly reviewable, and there were decisions going back to Padfield8 and
beyond that required ministers to give reasons for decisions. For Harlow, such review
was 'surely unexceptional by the standards of every contemporary judicial review
system'. 9 In terms of the intensity of review, she states that the court might have asked
whether the ministerial decision to reject the PCA's findings was so unreasonable that
no reasonable decision-maker would have made it, but that it was also open to the court
to hold, in the light of the statutory schema, that the 'findings of fact in an ombudsman
investigation are presumptively binding in the sense that they can only be rejected for
good reason'.6 0 As Harlow states,6 '
What is the point of setting up a fact-finding body be it an ombudsman
investigation, a tribunal, a public inquiry or parliamentary committee, if its
findings are simply ignored? There is no statutory avenue of appeal and
Parliament is not the place for a parallel fact-finding inquiry. And, as Wall LJ
stressed, the decision is 'procedural rather than substantial. The decision is
quashed as unlawful, and the Minister must think again' (Bradley at [138]).
This does not seem unduly onerous.
Similar caution is required in relation to an earlier report entitled Clearing the Fog
of Law: Saving our Armed Forces from Defeat by Judicial Diktat, by Richard Ekins,
Jonathan Morgan, and Tom Tugendhat. There are two principal lines of criticism voiced
against the Strasbourg Court: failure to disapply Convention rights in cases where British
troops act abroad, the claim being that it was only intended to apply in times of peace;
and that human rights law supplanted and undermined the older and more suitable body
of International Humanitarian Law, viz the four Geneva Conventions. The report
castigates the Strasbourg Court for unwarranted judicial activism, lack of sound legal
method and overbearing judicial power, the argument being predicated on the general
understanding that the ECHR should not apply extraterritorially. These views are, as is
common with JPP reports, expressed strongly and with conviction. The report is critical
and hard-hitting, on a politically sensitive issue. The twin foundations of the critique are,
however, highly contestable to say the very least.
The idea that the ECHR was inapplicable during war is, as Judge Greenwood 62 and
Eirik Bjorge have pointed out, impossible to square with Article 15 ECHR, which
provides that a state may derogate from the ECHR in times of war, not that the entire
ECHR was ipso facto inapplicable in such circumstances. Extraterritorial application of
the ECHR Convention was, moreover, not unheard of, or novel, when the Human Rights
Act was enacted, nor was the idea that the Convention applied in armed conflict. The
other limb of the argument, viz the JPP's critique of the way in which the ECHR treated
the inter-relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law, has
5 Padfield v Minister ofAgriculture, Fisheries and Food [ 1968] AC 997.
59 Harlow, above n 55.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 C Greenwood, 'Rights at the Frontier - Protecting the Individual in Times of War', in B Rider
(ed), The Law at the Centre - The Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at Fifty (Kluwer Law,
1999), Ch 17.
63 E Bjorge, Manning the Fogmachine of War: A Comment on the Report Clearing the Fog of War
(2015) UK Constitutional Law Blog <www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2015/04/15/eirik-bjorge-
manning-the-fogmachine-of-war-a-comment-on-the-report-clearing-the-fog-of-law/>.
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also been subject to critical analysis, with Andrew Clapham 64 and Eirik Bjorge
pointing out that the critique of the relevant Strasbourg decisions was based on a
misreading of the facts and legal reasoning in the instant cases.
The response by Eirik Bjorge generated a counter-response from Richard Ekins,66
to the effect that the argument of the original paper had been misunderstood; that Article
15 ECHR had not been ignored therein; that this provision for derogation rendered it
problematic as to whether the ECHR should continue to apply in times of war; and that
Strasbourg jurisprudence concerning the jurisdictional reach of the ECHR was open to
question.
This is not the place to engage in further deliberation as to these issues. Suffice it
to say the following: the fiercer the critique, the better must be the substantive foundation
of the argument, more especially so in relation to a topic that is sensitive and highly-
charged. The impulse for those involved in the JPP is to castigate courts fiercely for what
they regard as unwarranted usurpation of power. This impulse should be tempered
insofar as the critique is predicated on assumptions as to the positive law, and its
normative underpinnings, which are highly contestable.
V JPP EVIDENCE: LEGISLATION, COURTS AND PRACTICE
There is a further evidential component in relation to claims made by the JPP. It is,
less obvious than the issues addressed in the previous sections, but equally important.
The 'back story' to the present discourse reads something like this. Judicial review must
be kept within proper bounds, which from the JPP's perspective means that it should be
narrowly drawn. This preference is informed in part by its vision of the proper line
between courts and the political branch of government. It is also informed by a
perception of judicial review as predominantly red-light in its orientation, whereby the
judicial focus is exclusively on control of the administration, the assumption being that
the courts ignore the virtues of the legislation that is being reviewed and hence show
scant regard for what is known as the green-light perspective. This then reinforces the
demand for review to be narrowly confined.
This does not represent an accurate picture of judicial review at any time in its,
history. Judicial review has always possessed a Janus-like quality. It is the mechanism
through which judicial doctrine is used when an individual contests the legality of a
decision or regulatory norm made by a public or quasi-public body. This is the face that
we perceive. Judicial review is, however, also the legal mechanism through which the
courts routinely effectuate the regulatory schema challenged before them. The claimant
challenges the legality of a decision and loses, because the court does not agree that there
is such an illegality judged by the terms and purposes of the legislation. In reaching this
conclusion the courts interpret the statute to attain the specified objectives, and often fill
gaps to render the legislation more efficacious. This face is not hidden, but is largely
ignored in our evaluation of what administrative law is 'about'. It is clear from a reading
of the case law over circa 400 years that the courts were generally fully cognizant of the
value of the regulatory schema that they were interpreting, and strove to ensure that they
6 A Clapham, 'The Complex Relationship between the 1949 Geneva Conventions and International
Human Rights Law', in A Clapham, P Gaeta and M Sassbli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions:
A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2015), Ch 35.
Bjorge, above n 63.
66 Richard Ekins, The Reach of the ECHR: A Reply to Eirik Bjorge (2015) Oxford Human Rights
Hub <www.ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-reach-of-the-echr-a-reply-to-eirik-bjorge/>.
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were properly effectuated. There were perforce instances where the courts got things
wrong, proof once again that all institutions are imperfect.
This does not, however, alter the point being made here. Judicial review should not
be viewed solely in terms of being a constraint on legislative or executive power. This
did not represent judicial reality in 1616 or any date thereafter. There were as many, or
more, decisions in which judicial power in the context of actions forjudicial review was
used to ensure that the legislative or executive purpose was properly effectuated.
VI JPP EVIDENCE: LEGISLATION, COURTS AND THEORY
The discussion thus far has assessed the evidence used to support JPP claims. There
is, however, a normative foundation underpinning the Judicial Power Project, a vision
as to the legitimate scope of adjudication, with consequential implications for the
relationship between courts and legislature. This is unsurprising. Views concerning the
legitimacy of judicial decisions will inevitably be informed by some normative theory
concerning the nature of adjudication and its limits. The JPP is no different in this
respect, the principal intellectual contribution coming from John Finnis.68 He articulates
a vision of the judicial role, and defends it with characteristic vigour. The essence of the
thesis can be presented as follows.
A Thesis
First, courts adjudicate on the existing legal commitments that pertain between the
relevant parties when the matter is adjudicated. The focus is in that sense essentially
backward looking. The legislature, by way of contrast, has the responsibility to make
'new or amended public commitments about private rights (and public powers) for the
future',69 and in that sense it is forward looking. The executive is obliged to carry out
commitments as defined by the legislature and as adjudged enforceable by the courts.
Secondly, for Finnis, the declaratory theory of the common law is not fiction, but
a statement of judicial responsibility, capturing the idea that courts identify the 'rights
of the contending parties now by identifying what were, in law, the rights and wrongs,
or validity or invalidity, of their actions and transactions when entered upon and done'.7 0
The declarato7 theory is, says Finnis, a statement of the judge's vocation and
responsibility.7 Courts, especially a supreme court, may exceptionally depart from the
accepted body of positive law, because it is so out of step with principles or policies that
it should be regarded as mistaken. 72 In doing so, this should not, says Finnis, be seen as
akin to an act of legislation, even though it is 'new in relation to the subject-matter and
area of law directly in issue between the parties'.7 3 Firis acknowledges that lawyers
can disagree as to when such criteria are met, admitting that they are 'subtle and
elusive' .7
67 Craig, above n 2.
68 Finnis, above n 31.
69 Ibid 5.
70 Ibid 5.
71 J Finnis, 'Judicial Law-Making and the "Living" Instrumentalisation of the ECHR', in Barber,
Ekins and Yowell, above n 34, 76.
72 Finnis, 'The Fairy Tale's Moral' (1999) 115 Law Quarterly Review 170.
73 Finnis, above n 31, 5.
74 Ibid 5-6.
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Thirdly, courts should in general refrain from reforming or changing the common
law because their efforts are normally unproductive or counter-productive. The judiciary
commonly lacked the information from which to decide on the best reform. They were,
moreover, subject to time constraints and procedural limits inherent in the adjudicative
process.7 5 Courts were therefore ill-suited and lacked competence for anything more
than incremental law reform. 76
Fourthly, courts should recognize and accept certain legal precepts as embedded in
the law. For Finnis, this included the idea that courts do not and should not review the
manner of exercise of an admitted prerogative, and attempts to change such matters
should be viewed as contrary to the rule of law.n An analogous sin is said to beset the
Belmarsh Prison case, the reasoning in which was said to be fallacious and manifestly
erroneous.
Fifthly, 'in maturely self-determined polities with a discursively deliberative
legislature, it is not wise to require or permit judges to exercise the essentially non-
judicial responsibility of overriding or even of condemning legislation for its not being
"necessary", or for its "disproportionality", relative to open-ended rights and the needs
of a democratic society'. 79 Finnis regards such determinations as not properly within the
judicial realm, entailing balancing of the kind to which courts are ill-suited, and intruding
on determinations that were the preserve of the legislature.
Sixthly, there should be strict limits on the extent to which courts can update
doctrine through recourse to concepts such as the living instrument doctrine. It was
legitimate for courts to apply statutes or constitutions to new situations, provided they
fell within the 'categories picked out by the propositions expressed in the statute or other
instrument, even if the new instances of those categories were not envisaged at the time
of enactment'. But a court should not apply current values, ideas about right and wrong,
to ensure that an old situation 'would now be dealt with in a way that is new and
incompatibly different' ' from that originally intended.
B Comment
John Finnis' thesis provides the theoretical backdrop for those engaged in the JPP
project. His argument raises important issues that cannot be fully addressed within the
confines of this article, concerning matters such as the proper approach to treaty
interpretation, and broader issues of law and democracy. 82 There are, nonetheless,
comments that are especially pertinent, since they have direct implications for the JPP.
7s Ibid 7-9.
76 Ibid 10.
n Ibid 12.
78 Ibid 13-18.
79 Ibid 20.
s0 Ibid 23.
8" Ibid 23.
82 See: A Stone, Judicial Power, Past, Present and Future, A Response to Professor Finnis (2015)
Judicial Power Project <www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/judicial-power-past-present-and-
future-a-comment-on-professor-finnis/>; G Webber, Past, Present and Justice in the Exercise of
Judicial Power, A Response to Professor Finnis (2015) Judicial Power Project
<www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/gregoire-webber-past-present-and-justice-in-the-exercise-of-
judicial-power/>; M Elliott, Judicial Power in Normative, Institutional and Doctrinal Perspective,
A Response to Professor Finnis (2015) Judicial Power Project
<www.judicialpowerproject.org.uk/mark-elliott-judicial-power-in-normative-institutional-and-
doctrinal-perspective-a-response-to-professor-finnis/>. See, also, 'S Fredman, 'Living Trees or
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(a) Declaratory Theory ofAdjudication: Tensions
It is central to Finnis' theory that adjudication must be seen as declaratory and
backward looking. For Finnis, it must be so regarded as a matter of stipulation, since it
is only by doing so that the requisite sense of judicial responsibility can be secured. If it
were not so then a crucial factor in the divide between adjudication and legislation would
crumble, since the former would be forward looking, in certain instances at least.83
There is, however, a tension running throughout this reasoning: Finnis contends
that the instances in which change can be legitimately secured through the common law
should be closely confined, so as to ensure that courts really are declaring pre-existing
rights and obligations and not legislating;84 however his thesis as to what the declaratory
theory really means cuts the ground from under this conservative premise, since it could
be used to legitimate much change in common law doctrine.
This tension becomes apparent from Finnis' view as to the true meaning of the
declaratory theory. He notes the argument that courts make law, and that to pretend the
contrary is a fiction. He nonetheless rejects this view, sticking firmly to the belief that
the declaratory thesis, properly understood, accurately captures judicial responsibility
and preserves the line between adjudication and legislation.
The central tenet of his argument is that it is sound to say 'both that a settled rule
of common law existed [for many years], and that all those years the settled view that
the presupposed rule is part of our law was an error awaiting correction by better legal
reasoning and sound adjudication'. 85 It is therefore open to a court to hold that a rule
contrary to that understood to be currently applicable should apply 'as having been at all
relevant times legally correct and an authentic legal rule', with the consequence that 'the
newly declared rule would not, in the last analysis, be retroactive - would, in the last
analysis, abrogate no part of our law's substantive content'. 8 6 There are three difficulties
with this reasoning, which are especially salient for the Judicial Power Project.
First, while the whole thrust of the JPP is, as seen, towards the circumscription of
judicial power, the declaratory theory, as articulated above, would legitimate far-
reaching judicial change. Pretty much any incremental change through analogical
reasoning could be regarded as legitimate on the preceding criterion. More far-reaching
change could also be legitimate, provided that the shift could be seen as 'an error
awaiting correction by better legal reasoning and sound adjudication'. It might be argued
by way of response that there are certain changes that judges and commentators alike
agree should not be made by courts, but should instead be left to the legislature. This is
undoubtedly true, but the truth does not flow from, nor does it have any especial
connection with, the declaratory theory as advanced by Finnis, which prima facie
legitimates change in accord with the broad criterion set out above.
Secondly, this vision of the declaratory theory is grounded on problematic
normative and empirical foundations. The core of the argument is captured in the
following quotation.87
Deadwood: The Interpretive Challenge of the European Convention on Human Rights', in Barber,
Ekins and Yowell, above n 34, Ch 4; J King, 'Three Wrong Turns in Lord Sumption's Conception
of Law and Democracy', in Barber, Ekins and Yowell, Ch 8.
83 Finnis, above n 71, 76-8; Finnis, above 72, 173-5.
84 Finnis, above n 31, 5-6.
Finnis, above n 72, 174 (italics in the original).
86 Ibid 174-5.
87 Ibid 175 (italics in the original).
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[A]djudication involves the duty not to declare and apply a rule unless it can
fairly be said to have been all along a legally appropriate standard, more
appropriate than alternatives, for assessing the validity and propriety of the
parties' transactions. When that can fairly be said, the same rule, having been
declared and applied, is clearly the only legally appropriate standard for
assessing the correctness of the parties' belief in the legal validity and propriety
of their transactions.
The core premise is thus that adjudication is only legitimate if the rule now applied
to the parties before the court can be regarded 'all along' to be a legal standard that is
more appropriate than alternatives. When discovered this is then the 'only' legally
appropriate standard for assessing the correctness of the parties' belief in the validity of
their transactions, even if it is different from that previously applicable.
This reasoning is, however, problematic from both a temporal and a static
perspective. The temporal problem is that values and assumptions change over time.
There is no necessary reason why parties in the eighteenth century would, for example,
have the same view as to the most legally appropriate standard to judge unfair contract
terms as would their twenty-first century counterparts, and to pretend the contrary is
fiction. The idea that common law doctrine that changes to accord greater protection for
consumers can be deemed to have always been the law, on the ground that parties would,
all along, have regarded it as a legally appropriate standard, does not withstand
examination. The reasoning is also difficult from a static perspective, since there is often
considerable contestation as to what the best or most appropriate rule is in the modem
day. The court will perforce make the choice that it believes to be optimal in this respect,
but insofar as it is different from the previous law, that will be constitutive for the parties
to the instant case, and others who planned their lives on the pre-existing legal regime.
Thirdly, John Finnis' version of the declaratory theory elides the legitimacy of
change, with the characterization of the rights that people have always had. They are two
sides of the same coin. When change can be viewed as legitimate, as determined by the
previous criterion, the altered rule should be seen as the rule that always existed; there
has, therefore, been no retroactive alteration in the rights of those before the court; and
therefore we can preserve the veneer that adjudication is backward-looking.
This elision is problematic from the perspective of the parties before the court.
Adjudication that establishes a new rule where none existed will, by definition, alter the
parties' relevant legal rights and obligations before they came to court. From the
perspective of those parties, so too will incremental change, since the party that is caught
by this shift was not within the remit of the relevant rule hitherto, and thus the court
could not be said to be adjudicating on rights and obligations that such a party possessed
prior to the judicial decision. To reason from the assumption that because change or legal
development is legitimate, as adjudged from the holistic perspective of the legal system,
to the conclusion that the parties before the court in the instant case should accept with
equanimity that their pre-existing rights have not changed, does not follow. To reason
from the premise that change in the rules is warranted, to the conclusion that the parties
should acknowledge that the new rule is the only legal basis for assessing the correctness
of their belief in the validity of their transactions, when they had bona fide relied on the
pre-existing legal rule, does a disservice to those engaged in litigation. It is a theory
designed to preserve the pretence that courts do not make law, achieved at the expense
of the very people engaged in litigation from which the law emerges.
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(b) Adjudicative Change: Limits
Tensions are also apparent when the conservative dimension to the thesis assumes
prominence, with the consequence that change must be left to Parliament. The argument,
at certain points, resembles a form of common law originalism, such that if a proposition
has been embedded in the common law for some time it can presumptively only be
altered by legislation, not by judicial decision. Thus John Finnis believes that case law
on the prerogative dating from the seventeenth century could not legitimately be changed
so as to render the manner of exercise of such power reviewable.8 8 There are two
difficulties with this view.
First, it raises the question as to why the early decision should be invested with
such authority. There is a large body of literature concerning originalism as a form of
constitutional interpretation. The difficulties of this mode of reasoning are considerably
greater when applied to the common law. It is not self-evident why a judicial decision
given at a particular time should be invested with some special authority, such that
judicial change or alteration of the rule should be castigated as contrary to the rule of
law, or as acting contrary to the authority of established law.89
We need to tread carefully here. There may, as noted above, be good reasons why
courts think that certain changes can only be brought about by legislation. There may
also be good normative reasons why it is felt that the older rule should be retained,
because it is preferable to the suggested alternative. This can be readily accepted, but
does not meet the point being made here.
It remains unclear why a particular common law rule at a particular point in time
is invested with such authority. It is also unclear as to why it is illegitimate for the courts
to modify such a rule, where the change is not of a kind requiring the imprimatur of the
legislature, and where there are good normative reasons for preferring the alternative.
It is important when reflecting on this to recognize that the initial rule, whatsoever
it might be, became the 'law' because of an admixture of values, normative argument
and practice that led the earlier court to imbue a certain set of facts with a particular legal
status. This is true for any common law rule. It did not just 'happen'. It should not,
therefore, be regarded as beyond the judicial remit for a later court to re-think an aspect
of the pre-existing common law rule and modify it, provided that there are sound
normative arguments for doing so, and accepting that values may well have changed in
the intervening period.
Thus, the shift whereby the courts recognized that the manner of exercise of
prerogative power should be reviewable, subject to limits of justiciability, was entirely
legitimate, since there was no principled reason why the executive should fare better
when exercising discretionary power pursuant to the prerogative as opposed to statute.
If limits were to be placed on such review they should, as the House of Lords stated, be
grounded in the subject matter, not the source of the power. 90
Secondly, the Finnis thesis raises difficult questions about when change in judicial
review doctrine is to be regarded as legitimate. Does it mean that the shift from the
collateral fact doctrine to Anisminic and thence to Page92 was illegitimate judicial
legislation, given that the former doctrine had existed for over 300 hundred years? No
one claims that the collateral fact doctrine was wrong when expounded, simply that the
courts believed that there was a better criterion for review for error of law. What of the
88 Finnis, above n 31, 12.
89 Ibid 12.
90 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
91 Anisminic vForeign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.
92 R v Hull University Visitor, ex p. Page [ 1993] AC 682.
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subsequent shift from Page to Cart93 and Jones,94 with the limitation of review for error
of law in relation to tribunals? What of the expansion in review for error of fact? Or the
recognition of new heads of review such as legitimate expectation? If such developments
are regarded as illegitimate judicial legislation, being outside the bounds of incremental
change, and offensive to the idea that courts declare the law on the basis of pre-existing
rights and obligations, then this has significant consequences for legal development in
this area. If, by way of contrast, such jurisprudence is perceived as a legitimate exercise
of judicial authority then it throws into doubt how far the declaratory nature of
adjudication, as articulated by Finnis, places constraints on judicial change.
(c) Adjudication: Rights and Proportionality
It is evident from the foregoing summation that John Finnis is opposed to rights-
based adjudication and proportionality. There is a wealth of literature on this issue.
Suffice it to repeat for present purposes: the UK legislature chose to accord courts this
power and hence its exercise is legitimate as determined by Parliament; and the critique
that this type of power is wholly different from exercised by courts in other contexts is
based on a plethora of assumptions that are implicit, and contestable. There is, however,
another dimension to this inquiry, which is that the problems said to exist would be
obviated if the HRA were repealed. This argument is, however, far more contestable
than its proponents acknowledge.
Let us imagine a world with no HRA. Let us make two bare normative assumptions:
not all interests are equally important, and some interests are sufficiently important to be
regarded as rights. Disavowal of the first would be morally arbitrary; refusal to accept
the second is equally implausible in the UK in the present day. It follows from the first
proposition that there would have to be variable intensity of review. It follows from the
second that the courts would have to determine the meaning of the contested right. They
would have to decide the qualifications to such rights, given that many are not absolute.
They would have to devise a test for determining whether the qualification could be
invoked in a particular case, which might be cast in terms of proportionality or
reasonableness. They would, moreover, have to devise rules for the interpretation of
legislation/executive action that impinged on a particular right. These determinations
would be made taking full account of any relevant statute. This is, of course, much like
the common law that pre-dated the HRA.
For the avoidance of doubt, I am making no general claim concerning what might
happen if the HRA were to be repealed. I am not saying that the rights recognized at
common law would necessarily be the same as those in the ECHR. I am making no claim
that the courts should be able to override legislation. I also accept that the legislature is
very important in terms of rights' protection, and thus nothing in the preceding paragraph
is premised on the idea that courts are the only site for the protection of rights.
My point is more modest. It is to test the assumptions underlying the JPP's desired
promised-land. If you accept the two bare normative assumptions then the 'problems'
concerning the judicial role with which JPP advocates are concerned will not disappear,
and it is misleading to pretend the contrary. If you do not accept these assumptions, then
you have to explain this to many people, who would not accept such disavowal with
equanimity.
There is a further dimension to this line of inquiry, which is equally important. The
JPP concern as to judicial power is targeted at review of legislation and executive power.
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Review of the latter is clearly different from the former, more especially so given that
such review can encompass oversight not just of ministers, but also agencies, local
authorities, educational bodies and health authorities. The consequences of the desired
diminution ofjudicial control are unclear from the JPP, and there is equivocation in this
regard. For some, the desired outcome is that the contested executive action should
simply be allowed to stand, subject to exiguous controls in terms of Wednesbury
irrationality as configured by Lord Greene, which are in practical terms impossible to
satisfy. For others, there is talk of alternative modes of accountability, in which case
some details must be provided over and beyond vague statements that recourse should
be had to ministerial accountability or the Ombudsman.
VII CONCLUSION
It is, as noted at the outset, important to subject all forms of power to critical
scrutiny, including that exercised by the judiciary. It is equally important for the critique
to be objective, balanced and measured. I do not, for the reasons set out above, believe
that there is a crisis ofjudicial legitimacy in the UK, nor do I believe that the courts have
in some systemic and unwarranted manner encroached on terrain that is beyond their
remit. There are perforce legal decisions that are open to criticism, but this does not
constitute a legitimacy crisis, any more than instances in which Parliament strays from
a deliberative ideal, or the executive constrains the opportunity for legislative input,
betokens a deep crisis in the functioning of our political institutions.
Judicial power has doubtless increased in large part due to the enactment of the
HRA 1998. This was, however, a conscious decision of Parliament, and the courts have
in general shown sensitivity on epistemic, institutional and constitutional grounds in the
exercise of their authority under that legislation. Space precludes detailed consideration
of JPP papers and blogs attacking the CJEU and the Strasbourg Court. Suffice it to say
the following. The jurisprudence of those courts should be subject to critical scrutiny, in
the same manner as domestic courts. There are decisions from both courts that warrant
such criticism. There is, nonetheless, much in the JPP archive concerning these courts
that is intemperate, where the severely critical language is not borne out by the substance
of the argument being made and where it is predicated on theories of how, for example,
the CJEU does and should reason that do not withstand scrutiny. 95
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